This paper shows that the value function describing efficient risk sharing with limited commitment is not necessarily differentiable everywhere. We link differentiability of the value function to history dependence of efficient allocations and provide sufficient conditions for both properties.
Introduction
The literature on limited commitment was successful in explaining empirical patterns of consumption as the optimal response to commitment frictions. In particular, as pointed out by Kocherlakota (1996) , models with commitment frictions seem to be able to explain the positive correlation between consumption and current as well as lagged income. I show here, however, that Kocherlakota's result depends on the efficient frontier of risk sharing being differentiable which need not be the case.
1 As a consequence it can be efficient for current consumption to be uncorrelated with past income in the long run even if a commitment problem prevents first-best risk sharing.
There is a sense in which I replicate a finding of Kehoe and Levine (2001) that describe an economy with limited participation where the stochastic steady state equilibrium is history independent. The authors, however, fail to make the connection to the non-differentiability of the efficient frontier. This in turn allows us to go further by partially characterizing when the long-run properties of efficient allocations with limited commitment exhibit history dependence. Interestingly, for our stylized model which features symmetry these conditions are closely linked to differentiability of the value function at the point where all agents are promised the same level of utility.
I proceed as follows. First, I formulate a stylized framework along the lines of Kocherlakota (1996) . I then provide a counterexample to the differentiability of the value function and give sufficient conditions for history dependence which are based on differentiability. Finally, I conclude with a short discussion of my findings.
Framework
Consider the following stylized environment where people mutually share their endowment risk under limited commitment. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, . . . . There are two infinitely lived agents i = 1, 2, who receive each period a stochastic endowment of a single good. Let θ= {θ 1 ,θ 2 , . . . } be a sequence of independently and identically distributed random variables each having finite support Θ={1, 2, . . . , S} and denote the probability of θ t equaling s by π s > 0 for all s ∈Θ. Define a t-history of θby θ t = {θ 1 ,θ 2 , . . . ,θ t } and let Θ t be the set of all possible t-histories of θ.
The endowment for agent i = 1, 2 in period t is determined by the realization of θ t and denoted by (y 1 s , y 2 s ) with aggregate endowment Y s when θ t = s for t = 1 In fact, Kocherlakota (1996) falsely claims that the efficient frontier is differentiable. 0, 1, . . . . I assume that the joint distribution of the endowment is symmetric; i.e., for every s ∈ S there exists s ∈ S such that y i s = y j s and π s = π s . Preferences for both agents are described over θ t -measurable consumption processes
where Y = max Y s , and -given any history θ t -are represented by the utility function
where β∈ (0, 1). I assume that u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable and that lim c→0 u (c) = ∞. An allocation (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ C 2 is given by a consumption process for each agent and is feasible if
Furthermore, I say that an allocation is incentive feasible if it is feasible and incentive compatible for i = 1, 2, i.e.,
for all (θ t−1 , s) and t, where
is the ex-ante expected utility of autarky which is equal for both agents.
The concept of incentive feasibility allows me to define optimal allocations. An allocation (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ C 2 is optimal if there exists no other incentive feasible allocation that provides both agents with at least as much expected utility at period 0 and at least one of them with strictly more expected utility at period 0. It is possible to show that optimal allocations are described by the following functional equation:
subject to
The state variable u 0 expresses expected utility promised to person 2, while u s is the level of future expected utility promised when state s is realized. The constraints (6) and (7) are recursive equivalents of the sequential ex-post incentive compatibility constraints for agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. Denote by S 1 (S 2 ) the set of states for which the incentive compatibility constraint for agent 1 (agent 2) is binding. I assume throughout the paper that V (V aut ) > V aut , i.e., there exists some incentive feasible allocation besides autarky.
Notice that S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅. Furthermore, V is continuous and strictly concave. By Rockafellar (1970) , Theorem 25.3 and Theorem 25.5, V is differentiable almost everywhere and, since V is a proper concave function, the set D where V is differentiable is a dense subset of the domain [V aut , V (V aut )]. However, as I show next and in contrast to the statement in Kocherlakota (1996) , V can fail to be differentiable everywhere.
3 Differentiability and History Dependence
Counterexample
I proceed now by demonstrating that the value function V is not necessarily differentiable everywhere. Assume for the remainder of the paper that there exists y s such that
This condition implies that no first-best allocation is incentive feasible. Denote the fixed point of V byū.
Proposition 3.1. If S = 2, the value function V is not differentiable atū.
Proof. Denote the set of states by S = {H, L} indicating high and low income for agent 2. Hence, symmetry amounts to Y s = Y and π s = 12 . Since V is strictly concave, the RHS of equation (4) has a unique solution.
In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that V is differentiable on (V aut ,ū). It is straightforward to verify that only the incentive compatibility constraint of agent 2 for s = H is binding on (V aut ,ū). Guess then that the following allocation is a solution to the RHS of equation (4) 
is the lowest level of consumption that satisfies inequality (7) given u H (u 0 ) =ū and (iv) c L (u 0 ) solves equation
and c L is increasing in u 0 , it is straightforward to verify that these policy functions are incentive feasible. For the guess to be a solution, it has to satisfy the first-order conditions. From the Lagrangian we have that,
and
where µ 2 H (u 0 ) > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the binding incentive compatibility constraint. Using the guess, it follows that
, c H > c L and the incentive compatibility constraint for agent 1 binds when s = H, the guess satisfies both conditions and is in fact a solution.
Since c L (u 0 ) is continuous and u twice differentiable, the solution implies that
where the last inequality follows from the fact that no first-best allocation is incentive feasible. A contradiction.
The solution for the two state case shows that the state variable u 0 converges with probability one to a degenerate distribution of u 0 atū independent of initial conditions. Hence, it is optimal for consumption in the long-run to be non-autarkic and iid, i.e., to be completely history independent.
Sufficient Conditions
The problem of non-differentiability arises from the fact that -at some point in the domain of V -for every state s the incentive constraint of either agent 1 or agent 2 is ˆˆˆˆˆb inding, i.e., S 1 ∪S 2 = S. In the two state case presented above this is precisely the case at the fixed point of the value functionū where the role of the agents switches.
3
Lemma 3.2. Suppose S 1 ∪ S 2 = S at u 0 . Then V is differentiable at u 0 .
Proof. Letû 0 ∈ (V aut , V (V aut )) be given and suppose that {1} / ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 atû 0 . Let
be the allocation that maximizes the functional equation atû 0 . Define a new allocation by
. (14) Sinceû 0 ∈ (V aut , V (V aut )), c * 1 (u 0 ) > 0, and since for state s = 1 both incentive constraints are not binding, the new allocation is feasible for a small enough neighborhood aroundû 0 . Consider now the function v(u 0 ) that expresses the value of this new allocation for agent 1. Then, v(u 0 )≤V (u 0 ) with equality atû 0 . Furthermore, v is a differentiable in u 0 , as u is differentiable. Finally, u being strictly concave implies that v is a concave function in u 0 . Hence, I have constructed a function v that satisfies the conditions in Lemma 1 of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) , which proves that V is differentiable.
This lemma is helpful for establishing a link between differentiability of V and the long-run property of current consumption to depend on lagged income. Denote the Markov process for promised utility associated with the efficient allocation by the sequence of random variables u t , where u t = u s (u t−1 ) with probability π s for all s.
4
Proposition 3.3. If S 1 ∪ S 2 = S atū, the Markov process u t converges weakly to a non-degenerate invariant measure φ * .
Proof. From the analysis of the first part of Proposition 4.2 in Kocherlakota (1996) , it follows that the process u t converges weakly to a unique invariant measure φ * independent of initial conditions. Since no first-best allocation is incentive feasible, for all u 0 , S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅. Hence, symmetry implies that atū there exists s ∈ S 2 . By Lemma 3.2, V is differentiable and the first-order conditions of problem (4) imply that u s (u) >ū. Using the argument of the second part of Proposition 4.2 in Kocherlakota (1996) then proves the result.
Suppose now, the number of states is odd, i.e., S/2 / ∈ IN . Then, it must be the case that S 1 ∪ S 2 = S atū. Otherwise, by symmetry, the incentive constraint for both agents is binding in the state where both agents have equal endowment. But then S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅, which cannot be the case. Applying Proposition 3.3 this leads immediately to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4. If S/2 / ∈ IN , φ * is non-degenerate.
Whenever the invariant distribution φ * is non-degenerate, consumption is related to lagged income in the long run. What is interesting, however, is that this invariant distribution is non-degenerate precisely when the Pareto frontier V is differentiable atū, i.e., at the point where both agents receive the same promised utility. Hence, there is a link between differentiability of V and the long-run property of current consumption to depend on lagged income. The results here give then sufficient conditions for history dependence of optimal risk sharing allocations. 
